Which projects/firms should be the target of lending by a Public Development Bank (PDB)? What is the optimal design for the PDB's loans, and the optimal structure for delivering them? We analyze these questions in the context of a model where screening is costly to banks and underprovision of credit results from the inability of banks to appropriate the full benefits of projects they finance, more pronounced for high value projects. PDB intervention arises as a natural alternative to alleviate this inefficiency, since it originates in a failure in the private provision of credit. Lending to commercial banks at subsidized rates or providing credit guarantees, targeting the firms that generate high added value, are valid policy alternatives. Though in normal times PDB lending and credit guarantees are shown to be equivalent, lending is preferred when banks are facing a liquidity shortage, while a credit guarantees program is preferred when banks are undercapitalized. Direct lending by the PDB to the targeted industries could be superior to these subsidies to private lending, but only if the PDB's corporate governance is strong enough for public credit to respond to efficiency considerations rather than political concerns. PDB intervention naturally addresses credit underprovision stemming from failures directly affecting financial institutions, but it can also alleviate that arising from firm's moral hazard or insufficient access to collateral. JEL Classification: H81, G20, G21, G23
Introduction
1 Respondents of the World Bank´s Global Survey of Development Banks report participations in assets of between 9% and 19% in the respective market (Luna-Martínez and Vicente, 2012) . Lazzarini et al (2014) report that the Brazilian Public Development Bank, BNDES, represents over 20% of loans in the Brazilian credit market, and amount to almost 10% of GDP.
2 In "Rethinking the Role of National Development Banks" the UN (2009) de…nes Public Development Banks as "…nancial institutions set up (by the government) to foster economic development, often taking into account objectives of social development". The report goes on to state that these banks often work "mainly by providing long-term …-nancing to, or facilitating the …nancing of, projects generating positive externalities". We focus, precisely, on PDB's provision of funding for businesses. 3 The theoretical literature on banking also provides a number of models where relatively 3 is the natural policy response to these underlying ine¢ ciencies however, is not clear. Direct subsidies (e.g. tax exemptions) to projects with negative private pre-tax value but important positive externalities, for instance, seem a more natural and straightforward alternative to this particular ine¢ ciency. We study the optimal design of a PDB in the context of a model where banks use a costly screening technology to make credit decisions, and where they face at least some competition. Credit underprovision arises in this context as the result of the inability of banks to appropriate the full bene…ts of projects. High value projects are rationed out of credit because of this reason, leading to an ine¢ cient allocation of resources to lending. PDBs could thus play a central role in the …nancing of high value projects. Under…nancing of high value projects, and the implication that these are optimal targets of PDB programs, contrast with the usual emphasis on relatively weak projects.
A PDB is a natural policy alternative in this context, where the underlying ine¢ ciency resides in the banking relationship. A central contribution of this research is thus to provide a rationale for PDBs stemming from ine¢ -ciencies in the banks'supply of credit, while previous justi…cations of PDBs activity were based on the limitations of the demand for loans. Along the way, our model puts forward a novel source of ine¢ ciencies in the provision of credit, and brings implications regarding the optimal design of a PDB. In particular, we ask: 1) what types of …rms, if any, should be the target of particular public support programs?; 2) should the public …nancing of …rms take the form of direct or indirect lending? 3) if it takes the form of indirect lending, should the PDB lend to private banks at subsidized rates, or rather provide public guarantees (i.e. loss sharing)?
The model considers …rms that require funding in order to implement their projects. Firms belong to "industries", which are characterized by a risk pro…le, so that "industries"may correspond to sectors or types of …rms (young, SMEs,...). Within industries, …rms can be good or bad, and only good …rms have positive net present value projects. The simplicity of this basic setup has the advantage of allowing us to explore the interplay between our main mechanism and other justi…cations for PDBs and, thus, allows for an overall perspective on the main issues at stake. weak …rms will not have access to funding in spite of the fact that the project they want to …nance has a positive net present value. This is the case of …rms with a limited credit history (Diamond, 1991) , lack of collateral (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997, Ruckes, 2004) or, simply, risky (Bolton and Freixas, 2000) . PDBs may play a role in alleviating …nancial imperfections in all of these contexts.
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The type of a …rm is not directly observable to either banks or the government. Still, commercial banks have access to a costly screening technology that yields a signal that may or may not be informative (Ruckes 2004) . For any given …rm, the bank and the …rm will share the project's net present value. In equilibrium some good …rms will be credit rationed, so that there is room for public intervention. The reason for the underprovision of screening is that banks do not take into account the rents they generate for the …rm when facilitating its access to credit. Credit underprovision is more severe for types of …rms for which the rents the bank cannot appropriate are larger.
Rigorously stating the issues at hand confronts us with the need to de…ne what is speci…c to a PDB that makes it di¤erent, on the one hand, from a commercial bank and, on the other hand, from another government agency. We model the PDB as a bank, to the extent that it has access to the same screening technology and the same set of information that other banks have. Still, to the extent that it is publicly owned, it sources from public funds and pursues a social welfare maximization objective, although perhaps tainted by political objectives alien to the mere …nancing activity.
We evaluate welfare, measured by expected output net of the cost of potential government interventions, and show that intermediated public …-nancial support can improve over the market solution. Public lending to commercial banks acts as a subsidy that induces more screening and therefore more lending. However, competition among banks a¤ects the e¤ectiveness of the public intervention because each bank anticipates the increased activity by competitors as a result of the subsidy. It also increases its costs, given the redundancy of screening costs in a setting where several banks screen the same borrower. The optimal subsidy balances these considerations.
We compare alternative mechanisms of public …nancial support, considering the e¤ects of each mechanism on banks'behavior, as well as the implied costs of its intervention. We derive the optimal conditions for subsidies to commercial credit, as well as for public guarantees and compare the relative merits of the di¤erent arrangements. To implement this policy we consider, in turn, lending to commercial banks at subsidized rates or the provision of credit guarantees, in both cases targeting the …rms that generate high added value.
Whether subsidized lending or the provision of credit guarantees is optimal depends on the speci…c context. In particular, we develop extensions such as liquidity or solvency restrictions. Though in normal times PDB lending and credit guarantees are shown to be equivalent, subsidized lending is preferred when banks face liquidity shortages, while a credit guarantees program is preferred when banks are undercapitalized. Liquidity constraints in the …nancial market have been put forward by Armendáriz (1999) as another justi…cation for PDBs.
Other justi…cations for PDBs, residing in failures related to the demand of credit, have been put forward. We analyze how two of them interact with the credit supply failure in our baseline model. In particular, in additional extensions we bring to the table moral hazard (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and insu¢ cient collateral. We show that PDB subsidized lending and credit guarantees can be used to address these issues. The moral hazard case allows us to show that subsidies to …rms conditional on successfully implementing a project have the same credit-improving e¤ect of our supply-side instruments (interest rate subsidies to banks and public guarantees). A natural question, however, is the extent to which a PDB is the most natural agency to implement subsidies to the demand for credit.
By examining how di¤erent supply-and demand-side issues (liquidity and solvency, moral hazard, collateral) interact with our main mechanism, we shed light on optimal PDB design in a more comprehensive context than that of our baseline model.
The empirical literature has shown that …nancing constraints a¤ect more starkly particular types of …rms. For instance, small …rms report higher …nancing obstacles than large …rms, and the e¤ect of these …nancing constraints is stronger for them compared to more established …rms (See Beck et al. (2008) , Beck et al. (2005) ; and Beck and DemirgucKunt, 2006 for an overview). Nevertheless, there is also heated debate about whether the more intense obstacles to growth small …rms seem to face indeed make them the optimal target of speci…c policies, to the extent that their potential for growth may be lower than that of larger …rms. Our analysis contributes to this discussion, and related ones, by identifying features of …rms that make them optimal target of policies aimed at alleviating credit rationing.
In the next section we will describe our model and the …nancial market imperfection it implies. Section 3 discussses PDB intervention in our baseline model, comparing direct vs indirect PDB lending, and a subsidized indirect lending program to public credit guarantees. Section 4 extends the analysis to contexts with liquidity and solvency constraints, moral hazard, and use of collateral. Section 5 is devoted to the robustness of our qualitative results. Namely, we allow for more ‡exible speci…cations for the screening technology and/or the type of moral hazard present. Section 6 concludes by discussing additional implications of our model and suggesting avenues for future research on the role of PDBs.
The model
Consider an economy where all agents are risk neutral, and riskless interest rates are normalized to zero. Di¤erent industries are characterized by risk parameters p, where p captures the potential probability of success of good projects in the industry. Within industries, there are two types of …rms, good and bad, in proportions and 1
. Good …rms are at the industry's potential, facing probability of success p with an implied positive net present value, while bad …rms have a lower probability of success p , yielding negative net present value: If successful, a project undertaken by a good …rm yields an outcome of y per unit of investment; with constant returns to scale up to its full size I; so that a successful project of size I yields yI, while a null return is obtained if the project is unsuccessful (yp > 1 while yp < 1)
4 . The resulting cash ‡ow is to be shared between the …rm and its …nancier, and we assume there is an upper bound to the return of the bank. This can be easily justi…ed as a participation constraint, where the …rm, in the absence of a loan has a continuation value E (e.g. equity), in which case the maximum repayment to the …nancier will be an amount RI satisfying p(y R)I E: Alternatively, the …rm's surplus E can be interpreted as the cost of e¤ort,as in section 4.
Banks have a screening technology. The type of a …rm (good or bad, associated respectively with p or p ) is not observable to banks before screening. The value of p and p , by contrast, is observed by banks and government. A bank's role in the economy is to screen …rms, and thus to weed out bad …rms. We initially assume that neither banks'capital nor its overall access to funding (liquidity) are constrained and address such limitations in Section 4 It is easy to generalize our results so as to reinterpret y as the social return rather than the private outcome, to take into account the possibility of externalities that are present in Hainz and Hakenes (2012) .This very general setup allow us to interpret y as the sum y = y 0 + m + e; where m are informational rents à la Holmstrom and Tirole(1997) , further explored in section 4, and e is an externality, so that only y 0 is susceptible to be appropriated by the bank as a pledgeable cash ‡ow.
We do not rule out potential correlations between p, and y. To keep the exposition simple, however, our notation does not explicitly recognize these potential correlations. 8 4.1. The solvency issues, as well as moral hazard for …rms and the concurrent use of private collateral, are also addressed in extensions to the model in section 4.
Costly Screening
For every industry/risk p; by paying a sunk cost C(q); that depends upon the chosen probability that the screening yields a signal, q; banks obtain a perfect signal on the …rm's type, good or bad (p or p ). We assume C(q) satis…es C 0 (q) > 0; C 00 (q) > 0; C(0) = 0 and C 0 (0) = 0. That is, better quality screening is more costly, increasingly so. Because we assume the marginal screening cost is relevant, we view our framework as focusing on relationship lending, while lending based solely on automatic credit scoring is probably better characterized by a zero marginal screening cost.
Given our previous assumptions, if the bank receives a signal it will lend to good …rms and deny credit to bad ones. If the bank does not receive a signal, we will assume it will not lend, i.e. that it is not pro…table to lend blindly (namely, [ p + (1 )p ] y < 1). Screening costs are further assumed independent of the project's size, so that no mechanical ad-hoc relationship between public credit and …rm size is introduced.
E¢ cient allocation
A centralized planner that maximizes the aggregate net output will solve the following problem:
The solution to this problem implies that the e¢ cient level of screening is characterized by (py 1) I = C 0 (q(p)) for an interior solution (1) (py 1) I > C 0 (1) for a corner solution q = 1 9
Market Equilibrium
In our framework, because screening is not costly to …rms, a …rm simultaneously applies to all banks at its reach. Each bank to which a …rm applies will then choose how much to screen the …rm, and make o¤ers to those that are revealed to be good. Because signals convey perfect information they are perfectly correlated across the banks that obtain the signal about a particular …rm. Good …rms may receive more than one o¤er and will then choose to borrow from the bank that o¤ers the lowest interest rate. As shown by Broecker(1990) , there is no equilibrium in pure strategies and we will therefore characterize the mixed strategies one.
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Let N be the number of banks competing to supply credit to a …rm. 6 The probability of a bank j; j 6 = i; not granting a loan to a good …rm will be the probability of either getting a good signal but setting a repayment higher than a competitor, or getting no signal. The former occurs with probability 1 F (R i ), the latter with probability (1 q). For bank i quoting a repayment R i to be able to grant a loan, it has to be the case that the N 1 other banks either have obtained no signal or have quoted a higher interest rate. In turn, bank i will only make an o¤er if it has received a good signal, which occurs with probability q.
Consequently, when quoting R i ; a bank i confronted with N 1 competing banks will have an expected revenue equal to:
The following result is obtained:
Proposition 1 In the mixed pricing strategy of a symmetric equilibrium, for a given level of screening q, banks quote repayments R in the range (R; R), where R is given by:
and R < y is the maximum rate the bank can charge without violating the …rm's participation constraint (or it's incentive compatibility constraint in the context of moral hazard in section 4). The bank has positive pro…ts Iq(1 q) N 1 (pR 1) even for the lowest bound R.
Proof. See appendix A. The banks'participation constraint is always satis…ed (as long as pR > 1, which we assume) because of the convexity of C(q) jointly with C(0) = 0.
Given this equilibrium pricing strategy, it is easy to obtain the optimal level of screening in the absence of the government's intervention. The bank solves
In the mixed strategy equilibrium bank i is indi¤erent between the di¤er-ent R i in the support of the mixed strategy, including R, so that the pro…t
(1 q j ) given its competitors' screening strategy q j , and the fact that F (R) = 1. This allows to simplify the problem and obtain the bank's optimal screening level q i given q.
In the symmetric equilibrium this is
Notice that in the symmetric equilibrium, the corner solution q = 1; will never hold under costly marginal screening C 0 (q) > 0.
Credit Market Ine¢ ciency
Direct comparison of (1) and (4), given the convexity of C() and the fact that R < y, leads to a …rst result.
Proposition 2 Any equilibrium solution in the credit market equilibrium leads to underprovision of screening by banks.
The ine¢ ciency of the market equilibrium has two sources. On the one hand, screening generates an expected rent that is not fully captured by banks: the good …rm that is screened and obtains funding at rate R(p) obtains an additional output y R(p) with probability p On the other hand, because screening by one bank is a strategic substitute to screening by another bank, the existence of a competitor reduces the probability of obtaining R(p) and thus the incentives for a bank to screen.
Importantly, the presence of the externality behind this core ine¢ ciency is not due to the use of debt as the banks' …nancial instrument. Other types of external …nancing, in particular equity or a combination of debt and guarantees, would generate the same qualitative e¤ect so long as screening is necessary, as the …nancier's incentive to screen to …nance would be related to the fraction of the …rm's net expected pro…t the bank appropriates. This fraction is less than one except in the extreme case where the bank extracts all the rents from the entrepreneur. Notice that the point is quite general: it applies to any situation where the …nancier does not appropriate the full net present value of a successful project, so that sophisticated negotiation mechanisms between …nancier and …rm should not eliminate the externality.
Whether the core ine¢ ciency that we have pointed at can be partially dealt with, and how, depends upon the instruments available to the central planner. Since this ine¢ ciency stems from the nature of the …nancing relationship, it is natural to consider policy options in the context of government support to the …nancing of businesses. In other words, instruments available in the context of a PDB. We now study some such instruments.
Public credit policies
Consider government interventions in the credit market through a PDB that supports credit for businesses. We start with the case in which the PDB intervenes by supporting commercial bank lending, a usual practice. We then discuss di¤erences with the case where the PDB directly lends to …rms. The PDB pursues the maximization of social net output rather than the maximization of bank bene…ts, at the cost of distortionary taxation.
Intermediated lending
We start with a PDB that is able to subsidize the credit activity of banks. We later show that subsidizing commercial banks is equivalent to providing public guarantees in our basic model. We study to what extent and under which conditions it is optimal to set positive subsidies (or guarantees). 7 We model the cost of raising public funds to fund the PDB intervention, stemming from the distortionary nature of taxation, as per dollar spent by the PDB. We denote by S C the per dollar loan credit subsidy, which is conditional on the loan being issued by the commercial bank. The total cost of the loan subsidies to industry p will thus be I[1
We assume the industry characteristics, p, and loan rates are observable. It is thus possible to implement a policy of credit subsidies that is industry (or risk) dependent, S C (p).
The PDB chooses its subsidy S C , taking into account the way in which S C will a¤ect the set of
given the optimal behavior of the N banks. That is, the PDB solves the following (second best) problem:
f (p)dp subject to
where we have simpli…ed notation S C (p) and q(p) to S C and q, and where
C(q i ) = 0 and will depend upon the optimal S C .
The solution to the PDBs problem has to take into account the fact that competition undermines the e¤ectiveness of the subsidy to boost credit supply. The reason is that, because the screening levels are strategic substitutes, any increase in the screening level of one bank negatively a¤ects the incentives of other banks to screen. The PDB also considers the redundancy of screening costs by multiple banks, and the fact that its subsidies boost screening by all banks increasing the level of redundancy. The solution to this problem is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the symmetric equilibrium with q i = q for all i, optimal credit subsidies to banks are characterized by the following …rst order conditions for S C and q, respectively:
where is the Lagrange multiplier associated with each (symmetric) constraint 5. The implied optimal subsidy to banks is given by:
for S C S; where S satis…es the no deviation condition:
The intuition for (??) that characterizes the optimal S C , , is best seen through the …rst order conditions from which it derives (6) and (7). Equation (6) states the equalization of marginal cost and bene…t of S C when S C > 0, and implies that, at the optimal S C , the shadow price of relaxing each constraint is =
Moreover, the optimal S C ensures that the marginal cost and bene…t of each q i are equalized. The marginal bene…t of q i on the welfare function is given by q i 's e¤ect through the total supply of loans, valued at the associated externality p(y R) net of the cost (1 + )S C : The marginal bene…t therefore equals If (p) (1 q) N 1 (p(y R) (1 + )S C : In turn, the marginal cost of q i comes from its impact on the N constraints, and it has a direct and an indirect component. The direct cost from the increase of q i equals i (C 00 (q i )). The indirect cost, through the impact of such an increase on q j ; j 6 = i;
N 2 for each of the (N 1) j constraints. The equalization of these marginal cost and bene…t is exactly captured by equation (7). This is most clearly seen in association with the proof in Appendix B.
As can be seen from (??), when I(1 q)
N 2 I(pR 1) > 0; the optimal S C is positive. For this condition to hold, it is necessary that (y R); which measures the externality that generates credit underprovision in the market solution, is not only positive but also su¢ ciently large to overcome the various direct and indirect costs of the subsidy. These costs include: the distortion from raising taxes and redistributing them to the private sector; the increased screening costs by both the bank that grants the loan and the other banks; and the "leak" in the subsidy that results from a dampened e¤ect on q, given that every bank takes into acccount the strategic substitutes nature of the q j . Given these costs of the subsidy, the second best q falls short of the …rst best.
Our setup highlights the central role of the externality that leads to screening underprovision: …nanciers do not fully internalize the bene…ts of lending because they cannot appropriate them (i.e. y R > 0), and thus put less e¤ort than it would be optimal in obtaining a precise signal about a potential investment project. By pinpointing this speci…c market failure, the analysis makes clear that a subsidy to banks, conditional on their granting a loan, is a natural intervention, though one that is costly in many dimensions, and whose e¤ectiveness is dampened by competition across banks. The subsidy is therefore only justi…ed for groups of …rms for which credit underprovision is su¢ ciently severe. In particular, the analysis points out that the types of …rms/loans that should be targeted are characterized by:
1. A su¢ ciently high externality the subsidies intend to remedy, proportional to the bene…ts not internalized by the bank (i.e. high Ip(y R (p))). Notice that our analysis characterizes the second best for every level of y and : The whole analysis carries over to any dependence of y and on the industry characteristics, p; and, is, therefore, valid for any level of correlation between p and y on the one hand and between p and on the other hand.
2. Projects with su¢ ciently large …nancing needs I. Notice, however, that this is true only to the extent that screening costs are either independent of project size (as speci…ed in the basic model), or at least do not grow su¢ ciently fast with I. More precisely, if the slope of C 00 (q; I) with respect to I is greater or equal to 1, then the optimal subsidy is not increasing in the project's size, and may actually decrease with it, a point we further discuss in section 5.
Some of these implications challenge the conventional wisdom about valid targets for the public …nancing of enterprises. Credit for …rms/projects with high expected returns is frequently deemed unworthy of subsidizing, under the expectation that they will be particularly well served by the market. Our results, however, point out that these projects may be, in fact, the ones where subsidies will be more e¤ective. Low risk (high p) and high y industries are, in consequence, plausible targets for the public banks support policy. Namely, sectors facing particularly dynamic demand growth, or those to …rms with risky but high upside value projects should be the bene…ciaries of this policy.
Our results also make it clear that subsidizing loans for large projects/…rms may in fact be optimal given the large expected bene…ts of these loans, if the screening cost does not depend on the project size or if it increases less than proportionally with the project size. One may suspect that marginal screening costs actually decrease with project size (for instance because larger projects/…rms are required to disclose more information to authorities), in which case targeting large scale projects would be particularly valuable for PDBs.
It is also clear from these results that external positive e¤ects of a project on other …rms (other than the one receiving the loan), often deemed as the justi…cation behind the government …nancing of enterprises, are not a necessary condition for subsidies to be optimal. Even in their absence, the fact that the …nancier does not fully internalize the bene…ts of lending leads to loan underprovision. Of course, when positive externalities over third parties are present, they constitute an additional reason for an intervention that subsidizes loans, a point that is easily born in our model, by simply reinterpreting y as the total social value of the project.
Implementation: Subsidized Lending vs. Credit Guarantees Programs
A direct subsidy S C (p) per dollar of loan, conditional on the loan being granted, can be implemented by the PDB by funding credit in conditions that entail an implicit subsidy to the credit activity. A policy of subsidized funding to banks at a rate of 1 S C (p); reaches the second best allocation as banks'expected pro…ts will be I(1 q) N 1 (pR + S C 1). Alternatively, the same solution can be attained by providing a public guarantee. A fully subsidized credit guarantees policy will be de…ned by a payment of an amount G(p) to the bank in case the …rm defaults. In terms of the banks'incentives, credit guarantees imply that the bank return on a loan will be I(1 q) N 1 (pR 1) + (1 p)G(p) : Consequently, the credit subsidy can be implemented by setting
Still, notice that the upper bound to the possible values of G(p);is lower than
because it provides increased incentives to deviate to the no screening strategy. This is the case because when lending to "bad" …rms, the credit subsidy will be (1 p )G > S = (1 p)G 8 .
Direct lending
A straightforward way to alleviate credit rationing stemming from failures to the supply of credit is to structure the PDB as a direct lender to businesses, with access to funding and equipped with the same screening technology other commercial banks have. The fact that the PDB is owned and managed by the government implies that it departs from private …nancial institutions in that it may pursue the maximization of social net output rather than the maximization of its shareholders'value, and thus provide a level of screening closer to the optimum, at the cost of distortionary taxation. However, the PDB could also potentially be subject to political pressures.
8 A bank will prefer to screen …rms rather than to lend to the average …rm provided:
We will assume this condition is satis…ed, which implies G(p) is lower than the threshold G(p), for which the equation holds with equality.
Abstracting …rst from political interferences, a policy of direct lending implies the PDB will become an additional player and, thus, compete with commercial banks. Because it enters a pro…table market, there will be a positive side of direct lending if it plays the same strategy as other banks and obtains a positive pro…t equal to I(pR 1)q(1 q) N 1 C(q): that pro…t will be valued at 1+ per dollar, as PDB's pro…ts replace distortionary taxation. Second, because its objective function takes into account the total cash ‡ow y rather than the pledgeable fraction R; the PDB will set a level of screening-that we denote q P DB -higher than its competitors. By so doing, the PDB reduces the welfare loss from the externality p(y R), at the direct cost C(q P DB ) C(q) and the indirect cost of de-incentivizing private lending because screening levels are strategic substitutes. Every commercial bank i will now face a lower expected revenue of its screening, that becomes
(1 q j ) for bank i, and, consequently will reduce their level of screening. Because the maket solution q P DB = q is still possible, it is clear that by choosing the optimal q P DB ; the total amount of production will be increased. Thus, in the absence of political pressures and when access to the same screening technology is posible, direct lending dominates the market solution.
The comparison with indirect lending is more involved, as indirect lending also dominates the market equilibrium. While a subsidy would increase the level of screening of all commercial banks, direct lending will decrease it. The cost of indirect lending may be higher as all banks are subsidized while in the direct lending only the PDB losses (if any) may have to be subsidized. Finally, indirect lending leads to an increase of the cost of screening equal to N (C(q s ) C(q 0 )); where q s is the equilibrium level of screening when the subsidy is S and q 0 is the market level of screening, while direct lending will increase the PDB screening cost by C(q P DB ) C(q 0 ). That is, direct lending has the advantage of avoiding screening duplication induced by the public policy, so that this cost will be higher for indirect lending for given q s = q P DB .
Political and other biases reduce the value of direct lending vis-a-vis the intermediated model, since in the latter it is pro…t-maximizing private banks, not subject to political pressures, who screen …rms and decide who to lend to. There is nowadays an abundant body of empirical evidence that points at cases where credit allocation by PDBs is consistent with the PDB following political considerations rather than seeking to maximize e¢ ciency. Direct lending by PDBs has been found to increase in election years, and to be targeted to politically valuable costumers or regions, especially in election years (Carvalho, 2014; Cole, 2009; Dinc, 2005; Khwaje and Mian, 2005; Lazzarini et al, 2014; Sapienza, 2004) .
9 Such evidence makes intermediate lending more attractive as an alternative to direct lending by the PDB. This is why we concentrate here on indirect interventions.
Our framework also allows to address the highly debated issue regarding whether PDB activities complement or substitute commercial banks'lending. The results may be quite di¤erent depending on whether we consider direct or indirect lending. Because of the additional competition, direct lending will reduce commercial banks'pro…ts, and reduce their probability of granting a loan. That is, direct lending by the PDB implies substitution.
Indirect lending, instead, provides additional incentives to banks and therefore complements their activity by either supplying funds at a lower cost or by providing guarantees. Still, providing funds at a lower cost may be expensive, because the subsidies channeled through the PDB may merely create rents for banks and …rms, without solving the underprovision of credit if it does not a¤ect the banks marginal cost of funds. In other words, in order to increase the level of screening from q to q + q; subsidies will be o¤ered not only on the additional loans ( q); but also on the loans the bank would have granted anyway 10 . Since the PDB takes into account these costs and bene…ts of the policy, if the solution to the PDB problem involves S > 0, then it must the the case that the cost of subsidizing the loans that the banks would have granted without the policy is lower than the social bene…t of the resulting increased lending. If this were not the case, the PDB would …nd it optimal choose S = 0, with q = q 0 , an option available to it. That is, indirect PDB lending partly complements and partly substitutes commercial lending, with the balance between these two dimensions being socially bene…cial.
One additional dimension over which PDB intervention is expected to complement private …nancing is the provision of long term credit (Armendáriz, 9 One possible reason for the ine¢ ciency of direct lending is the institutional weakness leading to the direct lending process not being autonomous with respect to the government and the objectives and constraints of its leaders. Other causes are corruption and more stringent legal constraints that bind public agencies compared to private institutions. 10 Notice that additional taxes to banks' pro…ts, that are not conditional on the bank granting intermediated loans may be used to counteract this unintended consequence of the subsidies policy.
1999; The World Bank, 2016; Smallridge and De Olloqui, 2011 ). This focus is also supported by our analysis, to the extent that long term credit entails much higher screening costs than short term credit, since long term lending implies risks that demand more careful evaluation of the loan. Moreover, projects that have particularly high value will frequently require longer term …nancing than others (The World Bank, 2016) . In our analysis, the PDB precisely focuses on dealing with the under…nancing of projects of particularly high value, a problem that arises in the presence of positive marginal screening costs and that is more acute when these costs are higher.
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Extensions
We have so far discussed optimal PDB design when its intervention seeks to alleviate credit underprovision originated in the inability of commercial banks to appropriate the full bene…ts of the loan. But this goal may interact with other goals and constraints for the PDB. In particular, PDBs are frequently seen as playing a crucial countercyclical role (Luna-Martinez et al., 2012) ; as tools to alleviate credit underprovision from moral hazard on the side of …rms (Arping et al. 2010) ; or as tools to boost credit to projects that have negative net present value but high positive externalities on economic activity (Hainz and Hakenes, 2012) . Taking into consideration these other motivations for PDBs and understanding their implications for optimal PDB design requires more elaboration. Such is the goal of this section. We start by examining supply side shortages, and then move to demand-side failures underlying credit underprovision.
Supply side shortages
The discussion so far has assumed banks could issue both debt and equity in a perfect market so that the structure of their liabilities has been irrelevant, as it occurs in a Modigliani-Miller framework. Still, under stress, and particularly during a …nancial crisis, banks may face serious restrictions to either 11 It has also been suggested that one of the reasons why PDBs are particularly useful when coming to long-term …nancing is their greater ability, compared to private bank, to rely on long term …nancing (Smallridge and De Olloqui, 2011) . In our analysis, this would imply the PDB has a lower cost of funding in this segment of the market which would then decrease the cost to tax payers. 20 re…nance their debt or issue stock. Such limitations will have an impact on the supply of loans, and therefore, when this is the case, on the role the PDB may play.
We will now extend our framework to show how public funding to banks and credit guarantees will help ease liquidity and capital constraints and may, thus, be particularly valuable during times of crises characterized by these shortages. Interestingly, while in a perfect capital market subsidized lending and credit guarantees had the same impact, depending on the prevailing constraint, debt re…nancing or capital shortages, they will have di¤erent impacts.
Liquidity
A limited access to funds by banks can easily be incorporated in our bank model. A monetary contraction or a regulatory constraint on banks'funding implies an increase in the equilibrium cost of funds for banks, that will now equal r: The …rst order condition that determines banks'level of screening in the symmetric equilibrium, will now be the following:
Unsurprisingly the liquidity shortage leads to a reduction in the level of screening. Suppose that the PDB is able to continue lending at zero cost of funds (for instance, because it has access to credit by multilaterals). The second best program will now lead to an equivalent …rst order condition:
That is, the optimal subsidy is augmented when the PDB can source a lower cost than is possible for commercial banks, as is the case in liquidity crunches. This is true not only because the PDB perceives a lower cost of any credit activity, but also through feedback e¤ects, captured by the last term in S C .
In this context, subsidized lending and credit guarantees are not equivalent any longer. While the expected per-dollar-of-loan cost of a credit guarantee will be S C ; the cost will be equal to (S C r) when the PDB issues a credit line and bene…ts from the favorable spread in the cost of funds, reducing the cost of its intervention to taxpayers.
Capital Shortages
We have so far assumed away minimum capital requirements, which are in fact a prevalent characteristic of …nancial regulation. The banks' lack of regulatory capital, characteristic for instance of a credit crunch (See Bernanke and Lown, 1991), may also impose a limit to the banks' lending capacity. Denoting by the risk weight that the regulator has associated to lending to …rms, the constraint will be:
as I 1 (1 q(p)) N N is the amount of credit granted by a bank to …rms of type p in the symmetric equilibrium. Notice that the derivative with respect to q(p) is I(1 q(p)) N 1 f (p):Denoting the corresponding Lagrange multiplier by ; this implies that the new …rst order condition for q in the market equilibrium is:
The regulatory capital constraint constitutes a shadow cost of funds, which reduces the optimal amount of lending in the market solution. A credit guarantees program is an interesting policy alternative, provided that the regulatory treatment of guaranteed loans recognizes the fact that guarantees reduce the loss given default on loans.
12 In this world, public guarantees soften the regulatory capital constraint. Because a credit guarantees program reduces the banks'risk for the targeted loans, the risk exposure is reduced from I to a fraction (1
is the fraction of losses the PDB commits to cover. That is, starting from a world where the capital constraint binds (
f (p)dp = E), this public guarantees program transforms the constraint in
thus being equivalent to an injection of capital equal to G(p)
and allowing an e¤ective increase in total lending.
By contrast, subisdized intermediated loans are less e¤ective in the world where capital constraints bind, and thus the total amount of credit cannot be increased. This is the world where > 0 and
f (p)dp = E. Subsidized lending will, in this case, increase screening of some types at the expense of reducing screening for other types.
Generalizing our analysis, macroeconomic conditions may have exactly the same e¤ect as a liquidity or capital shortages. For instance, recessions may be times of particularly acute liquidity and capital restrictions for banks, especially when associated with …nancial crises. In any situation where the cost of bank funds increases while the PDB is not a¤ected in a similar way, the di¤erence creates a wedge, r; between the two that makes PDB lending comparatively less costly and it becomes e¢ cient for the PDB to expand its credit programs. Our framework supports the common wisdom that public …nancing by PDBs lending could play a countercyclical role (Luna-Martinez et al., 2012).
Demand-side failures 4.2.1 Firms'Moral Hazard
We now extend our framework to consider an alternative justi…cation of PDBs based on moral hazard as put forward by Arping et al.'s (2010) . When …rms engage in moral hazard behavior, as in Holmström and Tirole (1997), the resulting equilibrium is characterized by an underprovision of credit. cial regulator issued a decree (Decree 686, 1999) deeming these guarantees "admisible". Admisibility allowed …nancial institutions to use the guaranteed amounts towards their capital requirements (Arraiz et al. 2014) .
Obviously the decrease in capital, as in any credit risk mitigation measure, will depend upon the credit rating of the PDB. When the PDB has a poor rating, credit guarantees issued by the PDB may have a very limited impact.
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The basic Holmström and Tirole assumptions can be easily brought into our model, adding moral hazard to our baseline source of credit underprovision. We do so by assuming that …rms are able to choose a project that yields private bene…ts B at the expense of a lower probability of success, p p (or p p for bad …rms). Projects by …rms that engage in moral hazard behavior yield a negative expected return, even if the …rm is good: (p p)y + B < 1 For a given repayment R; the …rm will choose the high probability of success project, rather than enjoying the private bene…ts if and only if:
that is,
where
Denoting as R; R the range of interest rates posted by banks in a mixed strategy equilibrium without moral hazard, it is clear that moral hazard is irrelevant if R y 0 . Our baseline second best solution and the associated analysis of optimal PDB design continue to hold in that case.
We therefore focus on the case R > y 0 : In this case, banks in a decentralized equilibrium will never lend at a rate higher than y 0 :The mixed strategy equilibrium with moral hazard will therefore have a support [R 0 ; y 0 ] where R is endogenously determined by the equivalent of (2), so that pR 0 = 1 + (1 q) N 1 (py 0 1): Compared to an equilibrium in absence of moral hazard, this implies a reduction of the banks'expected pro…ts and, consequently, a lower q i :
A subsidy S C ; as previously explored, changes the equilibrium mixed strategies, ameliorating credit underprovision from both sources (inappropriability of the full bene…ts by the bank, and moral hazard). This is the case as the indi¤erence in the expected outcome of the di¤erent strategies (following a logic and proofs analogous to those of Proposition 1) implies
and
Notice, from the …rst order condition 3 expanded with the subsidy and the consideration of moral hazard, that for 1 > q i > 0; C 0 (q i ) > 0 implies py 0 + S C 1 > 0; and this, in turn using (13) implies pR + S C 1 > 0, so that the interval R 2 (R 0 ; y 0 ) is never empty. An alternative, apparently more direct, way to address the part of credit underprovision arising from moral hazard is a direct subsidy to the …rm conditional on the success of the project. This is equivalent to the PDB (or, more generally the government) o¤ering …rms a performance premium, so as to provide them with the incentives to choose the project with the higher probability of success 13 . Denote this performance premium by IP F (p). The moral hazard constraint (10) ; or R y 0 + P F :;In this case, the PDB is able to quote an interest rate in the range (R(p F ); y 0 + P F ): In other words, the subsidy to the …rm is passed back to the bank that in equilibrium will quote higher interest rates.
As the subsidies to the …rm and to the bank are not incompatible, it is possible to restate the PDB maximization problem as follows, combining these two mechanisms:
f (p)dp
The expression shows that, perhaps surprisingly, the two subsidy policies are equivalent: only the optimal amount of S C +pP F will be determined. The equivalence occurs because of competition, which forces banks to transfer a fraction of any subsidy they receive to clients. A conditional subsidy to the …rm of P F implies the bank is able to increase its lending rate by this amount, so it is equivalent to an unconditional subsidy to bank lending of pP F :
The logic underlying the equivalence between S C and P F is not unique to the moral hazard case. Even in absence of moral hazard, a performance premium makes borrowing to implement the project more attractive to …rms, allowing for higher interest rates and therefore more incentives for banks to lend. That is, performance premia also have the e¤ect of ameliorating credit underprovision arising from our core externality. Though understanding this equivalence is important, subsidies to …rms are not the natural policy tool for a PDB.
Private collateral
The existence of private collateral constitutes an important extension to our analysis. This is so because, as we will see, private collateral may substitute for screening.
To begin with, notice that, although both private collateral and public guarantees allow the bank to recover a fraction of the loan in case the borrower defaults, in the collateral case it a¤ects the borrower itself, with completely di¤erent implications on its incentives to apply for a loan. Because the borrower is not a¤ected by public credit guarantees, their existence will increase the banks'expected return and, therefore, it will also rise the screening level. As mentioned, credit guarantees-when optimal-play the role of a subsidy to lending. Collateral, instead, will play a key role in the …rms' self selection.
So far, we have assumed that a bank receiving no signal on a …rm will not …nance it. Nevertheless, this need not be the case if the …rm is to post collateral.
14 In this case, however, it is possible that the amount of the loan the …rm obtains is constrained by the availability of collateral and the …rm's project has to be downsized. We extend now our analysis to the case where agents are endowed with some exogenously given amount of collateral, which we denote V:
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As it is standard, we will assume collateral is costly, so that the V value of the asset to the bank is lower than its value to the …rm, (1 + )V , with > 0. In the present setup, collateral will play two related roles: as a signalling device and as credit risk mitigation.
Signalling allows good …rms to separate from bad …rms, if the latter are not willing to post collateral and, therefore, its use provides a substitute for screening.
Let R V (p; V ) be the per dollar repayment on a loan I collateralized with an asset valued V to the bank. Because …rms know their types 16 , when the value of collateral V is larger than some threshold, only good …rms will be ready to pledge their collateral. De…ne B as the collateral per dollar of loan that leaves the bad …rms indi¤erent between a partially collateralized loan and abstaining from applying for a loan. That is, B satis…es the following condition:
Then, any loan contract with a collateral to loan ratio
higher than B will deter bad …rms from applying for a loan. Because downsizing has an opportunity cost for the …rms, e¢ cient signalling contracts will be characterized by the maximum loan per unit of collateral, that is the minimum
. This implies the good …rm individual rationality constraint is trivially satis…ed, for any contract characterized by a collateral to loan ratio B . This ratio, jointly with V will determine the maximum size I at which the …rm will be able to develop its project.
Notice that whenever B <
V I
it is unnecessary for banks to screen …rms for collateralized lending. The use of collateralized loans implies that all good …rms have their projects funded so that there is no credit rationing due to banks'insu¢ cient screening.
Still, depending on the availability of collateral V and on the cost (1 p) of pledging it, banks'screening is more e¢ cient. Firms prefer to be screened by the banks if, by so doing, they generate higher pro…ts than by pledging their collateral, that is:
where I is the size of the loan required to …nance the project without downsizing. The condition is obviously met when collateral is scarce. Still, even if collateral is plentiful, if its cost is su¢ ciently high in comparison to the cost of screening, condition(15) is also ful…lled 17 . In the following we will assume the condition is satis…ed, so that both …rms and banks are 16 If …rms do not know their type, under our assumption of an expected negative present value for the average …rm, ( p + (1 )p )y < 1; if banks break even, …rms will make losses and, therefore will abstain from asking for a collateralized loan.
17 Because in equilibrium the per dollar expected pro…ts should be equal across banks, we have pR(p))
= pR V (p) + (1 p) B A su¢ cient condition for the above inequality to be satis…ed is: better o¤ if the bank screens. Notice, though, that when this condition is not satis…ed, and the …rm prefers to borrow collateralized because it has su¢ cient collateral, the policy implication is clear: the PDB should abstain from any intervention.
In the following, we focus on the case where, …rst, banks invest in screening, and, if no signal is obtained, they o¤er the …rm the possibility of a smaller collateralized loan that is only attractive to good …rms. We will assume that the …rm has the same probability 1 N to borrow collateralized from any bank. When this is the case, the objective function of the bank is modi…ed. If the bank obtains a non-informative signal, which occurs with probability (1 q), it will still be able to grant an amount
; partially collateralized by V which is su¢ cient to discourage bad …rms . Bank i pro…ts will now become:
The …rst order condition that determines the level of screening will be:
Consequently, the introduction of collateral decreases q through the "spare tire" e¤ect of collateralized lending when the bank obtains no signal. Of course, this does not mean that a policy promoting the use of collateral by protecting creditors'rights to repossession should not be implemented. It simply states that, if collateral lending is pro…table, i.e. pR V +(1 p) B > 1; then the existence of collateral has a cost in terms of relationship banking and in the lower level of screening it generates. The result is in line with Manove et al.(2001) model of "lazy banks" and has competition policy and regulatory implications.
because, in this case, the …rm prefers an uncollateralized loan, even in the absence of any downsizing, simply because the expected cost to the …rm of losing its collateral is higher than the screening cost to the bank. Still, this is only an extreme su¢ cient condition when, in fact, downsizing has an opportunity cost that makes our hypothesis of e¢ cient screening even more natural.
Our results shed light on two major regulatory issues. First it emphasizes the importance of a highly competitive market for collateralized loans, where barriers to entry (legal or related to the register of property rights) may be easily eliminated. Indeed, the lower the banks'market power in the collateralized market, pR V + (1 p) B 1; the higher the level of screening in the uncollateralized segment. Second, regarding banks capital regulation, it implies that collateralized loans should have a very low capital charge, in line with Basel II and III.
Thus, overall, the introduction of collateralized lending will, on the one hand, increase the total output but, on the other hand, diminish the bank's incentive to screen.
Because the subsidy in case of a collateralized loan is not justi…ed, the second best problem becomes:
s:t:
The optimal subsidy is given by the following formula. (see Appendix C for its derivation):
where 1 (py 1)
29 When comparing the level of the subsidy when there is no collateral, (8) with the one obtained in the presence of collateral (18), notice …rst that for 1 = 2 = 0; the formula of (18) is precisely the one of (8).The additional term 1 corresponds to the increase in welfare created by collateral: a good …rm that is unlucky on its screening, will still be able to get a loan
; so the social cost of the underprovision of screening is not as high as before. On the other hand, 2 is the pro…t on a collateralized loan that has a negative impact on the level of screening, because of the spare tire e¤ect. This implies that, in the presence of collateral, a zero screening level could be attained in equilibrium, in spite of the zero marginal cost of screening if the bank margin (pR 1) is small. As can be seen from the sign in (18), while the …rst e¤ect 1 decreases the subsidy by decreasing the cost of a good …rm not beeing able to …nance its project at the right scale, the second e¤ect depresses the level of screening and it will lead to a positive impact on the optimal subsidy so as to increase it. In the case of pure competition, 2 = 0; the subsidy will always be lower than the one in the case of no collateral (8) as only the …rst e¤ect will take place.
This expression allows us to identify the industries that should be targeted. Notice that if q > 0; then (pR 1)I 2 > 0, (as otherwise the pro…ts on collateralized loans being higher …rms would prefer q = 0): Consequently, only industries characterized by a su¢ ciently large (p(y R)I 1 + 2 will be susidized.
For a given expected pro…t, our …ndings square with the argument that …rms lacking the possibility of collateralizing their loans, or facing limited competition in the collateralized loan market (with 1 + 2 low in absolute value or even positive), are desirable targets of public …nancing. In particular, low available collateral V and high minimum required collateral B make it more likely that the above condition is ful…lled. Young …rms, and those in sectors holding little pledgeable assets (such as services), are likely examples of such targets.
Robustness
At this stage it is interesting to examine how robust are our qualitative results. We study how results are a¤ected by di¤erent changes in our basic assumptions.
Alternative screening technology
Would the same results hold if, instead we had a screening technology based on an imperfect signal? The answer is a¢ rmative provided the quality of the signal is costly.
Suppose that screening will provide a signal s on the …rms'distribution of cash ‡ows y; generating an ex post distribution with density function f (y j s);which is informative about y in the sense of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), so that high signals imply a higher probability mass on the high cash ‡ows. When this is the case, the optimal decision for the bank will be to lend whenever the signal is higher than some threshold s . The bank choice of screening corresponds then to the precision of the signal s; ranging from a perfect signal y = s at a high cost to no precision at all (in which case f (y j s) = f (y)) at zero cost. The precision level will result from pro…t maximization and, again, will not take into account the bene…ts accruing to the …rms of the choice of precision, p(y R(p)) that generates the externality. Consequently, the resulting equilibrium will be characterized by an underprovision of credit and a policy of subsidized loans will improve the allocation.
Still, the analysis of competition will lead to di¤erent conclusions, because bad …rms will have a chance to be granted credit. This implies, as in Broecker(1990) that when the population of banks increases, the chances of bad …rms to obtain credit increases and, for a given interest rate, the average return on a bank loan may decrease.
Screening costs and interest rates that depend on loan size
We have assumed that the screening cost does not depend upon the size of the project and of the loan. This seems a reasonable yet critical assumption. Indeed, if the screening costs were to be proportional to the projects'size, it would imply that size is irrelevant in the screening decision and small …rms would have the same chances of being …nanced as large …rms. As a result, the optimal subsidy would no longer depend on the size of the project. This is easily seen by assuming that the screening cost is given by C (q) = Ic (q), so that C 00 (q) = Ic 00 (q). Introducing this expression in equation (8) that de…nes the optimal level of the subsidy, it is clear that I disappears from this expression.
Industry speci…c screening costs
Finally, it is often argued that screening might be more or less costly in di¤erent industries (representing, in our framework, groups of …rms that share some characteristic).. This is the case, for instance, for SMEs. As stated by Beck et al. (2008, p.1-2) "Both high transaction costs related to relationship lending and the high risk intrinsic to SME lending explain the reluctance of …nancial institutions to reach out to SMEs". In addition, the scarcity of reliable data on SMEs and the possible manipulation of their …-nancial statements make screening more costly. The same arguments should apply for young …rms as well as for young industries. In our model, if repeated lending to the same industry decreases the screening cost, the optimal subsidies should also progressively decrease. When this is the case, subsidies should be directed to "nascent" industries and should disappear from "senescent" ones.
We have considered the screening costs faced by banks and the expected value of projects as exogenous to the banks'activities. However, some public development banks also have consultancy activities directed to both …rms and banks. This is the case, for instance, of the Business Development Bank of Canada or Bancoldex (Colombia). If the PDB is able to decrease the cost of screening (e.g. by improving accounting standards, or corporate governance), this will increase access to credit, and should therefore decrease subsidies for screening to the industry and its cost.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a framework to analyze the role of PDBs. We argue that the main justi…cation for this type of institution is not to be found in either the positive externalities of some negative net present value projects or on the …rms'limits to contract upon their future actions and the moral hazard that those limits imply. Instead, we propose that the main role PDBs may play is to help deal with …nancial market imperfections. The fact that …nancial institutions face potentially large screening costs when lending to …rms makes the environment we model a natural candidate to analyze the merits of di¤erent possible PDB arrangements.
As we show, screening costs imply that some positive net present value …rms are suboptimally deprived from funds, thus introducing a major friction in the credit market. This result implies that (ine¢ cient) under…nancing is particularly acute and costly for society in the context of high net present value projects, contrary to conventional wisdom. This …nding shifts the spotlight from the usual focus on public …nancing for risky small business that lack su¢ cient collateral, those with a limited credit history, or those with a low present value. Instead, our results highlight that PDBs should provide incentives for commercial banks to increase their screening of highly pro…table …rms/projects. When banks are unconstrained, this could be done indi¤erently through re…nancing at low rates or with a credit guarantees program at rates below the market price (CDS). Still, if banks face liquidity constraints, indirect lending dominates, while if they are capital constrained, credit guarantees that reduce the weight of risky assets in the portfolio, will be more e¤ective.
The fact that the credit market failure underlying suboptimal private provision of credit is the presence of screening costs also points to additional components of e¤ective government intervention in the credit market. Of particular importance are e¤orts to boost innovation in screening technologies, including the strengthening of public sources of information on the productive sector, both at the individual …rm level and regarding the economic perspectives of speci…c industries or types of …rms. To the extent that information and screening technologies have public good characteristics, this is a task in which government intervention has a high potential value. In practice, it is not unusual for governments and multilaterals to support the banking industry in the strengthening of screening technologies.
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Our framework also lends itself naturally to comparing developed and emerging markets in terms of both the potential extent of under…nancing and the potential e¤ectiveness of PDB intervention to successfully address this market imperfection. On the former front, our framework captures some of the reasons why under…nancing may be particularly acute in emerging markets, such as underdeveloped …nancial sectors with poor screening technologies, poor property rights enforcement, and/or low access to e¤ective collateral. On the latter, it warns that countries with weak …scal capacity 18 For example, the World Bank Group's International Financial Corporation provides advice to …nancial institutions in assessing the potential of speci…c types of clients.
(See, e.g., IFC's SME Banking Knowledge Guide, 2010, pages 44-48 for an example on advice for screening SMEs). In another front, the Colombian public agency for the …nancing of innovation runs a program that subsidizes selected bank proposals for the development of screening programs for startups (see https://www.innpulsacolombia.com/sites/default/…les/convocatoria_bancos_-a_creer.pdf).. may face particularly high distortionary costs of taxation and also be confronted with di¢ culties in establishing PDBs with a strong enough corporate governance to be able to isolate itself from political pressures and acquire the best banking practices.
One natural question is to what extent our model sheds light on the activities of public …nancial institutions that provide …nancing to activities other than productive projects. One particular interesting …eld is the public …nancing of real estate. Institutions such as Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac in the United States are also prevalent around the world. While our model ignores distributive considerations, it still shed light on some potential e¤ects of such interventions. In fact, in the context of costly screening of our model, real estate should never be supported by PDBs. This is the case, …rst, because the loan is likely to be su¢ ciently collateralized, so that subsidizing credit activity is unnecessary. Second, the marginal screening cost may be zero, as it happens with loans based on credit scoring, so that any subsidy will have no e¤ect on banks incentives to increase the quality of their screening. Consequently, absent considerations regarding redistribution the case for subsidizing residential mortgages is a very weak one. Put di¤erently, the existence of screening costs and imperfect information about buyers is not a plausible reason to argue that private real estate funding is ine¢ ciently low, or that a PDB should provide such funding. Similar arguments have been made by Beck et al (2012) and Sassi and Gasmi (2014) . Of course, alternative considerations regarding redistribution could support public mortgages, in which case the optimal design of such policies would need to address those particular considerations.
Assuming costly screening is clearly a natural view of the banking lending process. Still, alternative …nancial market imperfections might presumably lead to di¤erent conclusions regarding the role of PDBs in improving resource allocation. This as a potentially fruitful area for future research.
Although we cover a number of important extensions, much ground is still to be explored even within the scope of a model based on the existence of screening costs. In particular, the political economy of PDBs, elegantly addressed by Hainz and Hakenes(2012) is dismissed in our model by referring to the empirical evidence without modelling the actual trade-o¤s. While we consider that the second tier intermediated lending by the PDB is free from political interference, the actual analysis may be much richer, as it is possible to sustain an ine¢ cient senile industry by subsidizing both banks and …rms for political reasons. Such deviations from e¢ ciency, in turn, lead to the issue of PDBs corporate governance, an issue that deserves much deeper research, as it is directly linked to the one of government owned …rms (and banks).
The of PDBs in the business and credit cycle also goes beyond the streamlined conclusions that our approach yields. The issue of the PDB's access to funds is also to be addressed, and its ability to provide …rms with credit over a longer maturity may have an important impact on the ability of …rms to undertake long run investments.
To conclude, we believe it is relevant to explore the justi…cation of PDB activity in the light of what is known about …nancial markets imperfections. The costly screening approach seems natural and provides a simple framework that allows to draw interesting non trivial conclusions. Clearly, as the …eld has not been widely researched, we expect future contributions to provide new additional insights in this area.
7.1 Appendix A: Proof of proposition 1: banks'pricing strategy
When quoting R i ; a bank i confronted with N 1 competing banks will have an expected revenue equal to:
Because in a mixed strategy equilibrium all strategies yield the same expected pro…t, the equality (R i ) = K allows us to obtain the common cumulative probability distribution F (R); that satis…es K = q i I(pR 
Appendix B: Proof of proposition 3
Dropping the dependence of S C and q i on p in the notations, the PDB problem under competition is:
(1 q j ) = C 0 (q i ) for each bank i (20)
Denote by i the Lagrangian multiplier associated to constraint (??) for bank i. The Lagrangian …rst order conditions for S C and q i become, respectively:
(1 q j ) 0 " 
(1 q j ) (pR + S C 1)I 2 C 0 (q i )) = 0 i = 1; :::N S C 0; 1 q i 0;
Denote, as before, by i the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the …rst constraint:
The …rst order conditions with respect to S C and q are:
(1 q k ) (pR + S C 1)I 2 = 0
In a symmetric equilibrium q i = q and i = , substracting the above conditions read as follows.
while optimal bank behavior is characterized by
(1 q) N 1 (pR + S C 1)I 2 C 0 (q)) = 0
Substracting from (22a) yields:
(1 q) N 1 (p(y R) (1 + )S C )I 1 + 2
(1 q) N 2 (pR + S C 1)I 2 = 0
For S C > 0 we obtain = (1 (1 q) N ) N (1 q) 2N 2 C 00 (q) (N 1) (1 (1 q) N ) N (1 q) N (pR 1)I 2 g
